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Abstract
Consider a politician who has to take two sequential decisions during his term in office.
For each decision, the politician faces a trade-off between taking what he believes to be
the decision that generates a public benefit, thus increasing his chances of re-election, and
taking the decision that increases his private gain but is likely to decrease his chances of
re-election. In our results we find that if the politician is a good enough decision maker
and he desires to be re-elected enough, he takes the action that generates a public benefit
regardless of his private interests. Moreover, we find that the behavior such that the
politician delays taking the action that generates a public benefit to the last period of his
term in office before he is up for re-election is optimal if and only if he has either very
high or very low decision making skills.
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1 Introduction
Politicians regularly face a trade-off between choosing what is best for their constituency
and what is best for their own private benefit. On the one hand, choices that enhance the
living standards of citizens improve the politician’s chances of re-election. On the other
hand, the politician may be tempted instead to take choices that target his own private
benefit. As Barro (1973) puts it, sources of private gain for a politician could be “payments
from recipients of government contracts . . . increased business with a politician’s law firm,
promises of future employment . . . provision of personal services . . . ”.
In this paper we consider a politician in office who has to take two sequential decisions
before the next elections. Before taking each decision, he has a prior on what the socially
optimal alternative is (the public decision). On top of that, he has a private interest in
choosing a particular option (the private decision), not necessarily the same as the public
decision. After each decision, it is known whether the politician took the public decision or
not. After both decisions are taken, the politician is re-elected if and only if he took the
public decision at least once. We study how different factors affect the politician’s incentives
to choose what he believes to be the public decision. These factors are how much the politician
enjoys the private decision, how good a decision maker he is (i.e. the quality of his prior) and
how much he desires to be re-elected.
In our analysis we obtain two main results. First, if the politician is a good enough
decision maker and he desires to be re-elected enough, he takes what he believes to be the
public decision at least once regardless of how large his private interests are. The novelty of
this result is that it holds even if for fixed decision making skills and desire for re-election
the politician’s private interests are made arbitrarily large. The reason for this is due to the
fact that there are times when the public decision coincides with the private decision. Hence,
if the politician can to some degree guarantee himself re-election because of being a good
decision maker and if his desire to be re-elected is sufficiently high, it is optimal for him to
simply wait for the times when the public decision coincides with the private one.
Second, the behavior such that the politician delays taking the decision that generates a
public benefit to the last period of his term in office right before he is up for re-election is
optimal if and only if he has either very high or very low decision making skills. In particular,
a politician that is a good decision maker starts-off by taking the private decision to then take
what he believes to be the public decision when elections approach. The politician can behave
in such a way in this case as he is somewhat certain that he will take the public decision in
the second period, securing re-election. A bad decision maker cannot be sure of what the
public decision is. Thus, he believes that re-election is unlikely regardless of how he behaves.
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Hence, although the politician wants to be re-elected, he also wants to make sure he enjoys the
benefit from taking the private decision. Therefore, he starts off by ensuring himself a certain
payoff by taking the private decision and then tries to improve his chances of re-election by
taking what he believes to be the public decision. A politician who is neither a good decision
maker nor bad one needs to be more cautious and start off by choosing what he believes to
be the public decision in order the improve his chances of re-election. Only if the politician
has the public backing because he took the public decision, he will then choose according
to his private interests. The novelty of this result is that we find a rational explanation for
the behavior such that the politician follows his private agenda at the beginning of his term
in office and then tries to be re-elected by taking the public decision, without assuming any
kind of a memory effect on voters nor time inconsistencies by the politician.
The economic literature analyzing political processes has its roots in Downs (1957). The
politician’s trade-off between private and public interests is usually referred to as the polit-
ical agency model, pioneered by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986). In this literature, the
relationship between the citizens and the politician is the same as that of a principal and an
agent in the principal agent problem; citizens hire the politician to take certain decisions, the
politician can shirk by taking the choices that increase his personal gain and citizens try to
avoid this by not re-electing.
In this paper, we consider the political agency model as just described but, as opposed
to previous literature, we allow for several decisions to be taken per term. This permits us
to characterize and understand the specific decision rules that the politician may employ. In
particular, we are interested in understanding when the politician takes public decisions as
opposed to private ones, and why these decisions are sometimes taken at the beginning of
the politician’s term in office and other times they are taken at the end of his term before
elections (recall the Kansas farmer’s quote “what have you done for me lately”, found, for
instance, in Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) or Ferejohn (1986), see also Sarafidis (2007) and
Smart and Sturm (2007), Ferraz and Finan (2005), Pettersson-Lidbom (2006) or Besley and
Burgess (2002) for empirical references).1
As opposed to Ferejohn (1986), we focus our attention on the current politician in power
and on how he solves the trade-off between public and private interests. Moreover, our focus
is not on who wins each election and on what are the political views of the winner (as in
Van Weelden (2013)), but rather on how the winner takes decisions depending on his own
1Most of this empirical literature assumed that politician has a maximum number of terms. Hence, the
standard prediction of the political agency model is that the politician shirks when he is in his last term in
office. In our model, there is no term limit and shirking occurs because there are multiple decisions per term.
Moreover, in our paper the politician chooses not only whether to shirk or not but also when.
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characteristics. On top of that, unlike some of the previous political agency models, we do not
need to consider different settings depending on whether or not the politician’s characteristics
are common knowledge or private knowledge (Bernhardt et al. (2009) or Bernhardt et al.
(2011)), as citizens only care about the quality of the politician’s decisions, not on what
motivated him to take each decision.
Previous literature has also looked at the role of commitment in elections. With commit-
ment, the politician chooses the decisions that he will take while in office at the beginning of
his term. This has been shown to suffer from time inconsistency problems (Alesina (1988))
and, on top of that, it leaves open questions about the politician’s reputation and how the
citizens can punish candidates with unfulfilled promises (Aragone`s et al (2007)). Instead, in
our model, citizens evaluate the performance of the politician according to the decisions he
took while in office. Thus, there is no role for commitment as only actual events instead of
promises matter for re-election.2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the model. We
present our main results in section 3. Finally, section 4 concludes. All mathematical proofs
are presented in the appendix.
2 The Model
There are 2 time periods per term, where each time period represents a decision of the
politician.3 At each time t ∈ {1, 2}, the state of nature can take two values, st ∈ {0, 1},
both equally likely. The state of nature represents what is the socially optimal decision at a
certain point in time (the public decision). At each t and before knowing the realization of st,
the politician has to take a decision, dt ∈ {0, 1}. Prior to taking each decision, however, the
politician receives a signal θt ∈ {0, 1} about the state of nature. The signal θt is interpreted
as what the politician believes to be the public decision. The signal θt has quality q ∈
[
1
2 , 1
]
for all t where q represents how good a decision maker the politician is.4 In particular, for
all t
Pr (st = 0|θt = 0) = Pr (st = 1|θt = 1) = q.
2For more on the role of commitment and time inconsistencies in a sequential policy making model see
Bueno de Mesquita and Landa (2014).
3The case where there is only one time period (i.e. the politician takes only one decision per term) is
considered in the seminal paper of Ferejohn (1986) and more recently in Van Weelden (2013). The working
paper version of the present paper (Rivas (2014)) deals with the cases where there is only one time period (i.e.
one decision) per term and when there are more than two.
4Note that given that we deal with a binary policy/binary state space model both the quality of information
and the politician’s decision making skills are equivalent concepts yet this is not true in general.
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At the end of each time period t the realization of st is known. If for a given t we have
that dt = st, we say that at time t the politician took the public decision. Let rt ∈ {0, . . . , t}
be the number of times the politician took the public decision up to time t included, that is,
rt = #{n ∈ {1, . . . , t} / dn = sn}.
At the end of period 2 voters decide whether or not to re-elect the politician. If the
politician is re-elected then the game restarts, if not, the game ends. We assume that citizens
re-elect the politician if and only if he took the public decision at least 1 time. That is, the
politician is kept in power if and only if r2 ≥ 1. Note that the role of the electorate in our
model is a passive one.5 Moreover, we deliberately assume that voters have perfect memory
within each term, i.e. they remember equally well the first period as well as the second one
when the politician is up for re-election. If voters had better memory of more recent events
then there will be an obvious reason why we observe politicians to be more selfish at the
beginning of their terms in office and less so at the end. One of the purposes of this paper
is to show that memory considerations are not needed for such behavior and that, therefore,
there are more intricacies to the incentives faced by the politician that need to be explored.
The game we just described is illustrated in figure 1.
Figure 1: The Game
t = 0
(θ1, d1, s1)
t = 1
(θ2, d2, s2)
t = 2
if r2 ≥ 1
We assume that the politician enjoys being popular among the electorate. We represent
this in the model by assuming that if the politician takes the public decision, then his utility
increases by 12 units.
6 On top of popularity, the politician has its own private agenda. In
particular, the politician receives extra utility α2 ≥ 0 whenever he takes decision 1 (the private
decision).7 Finally, we assume that the politician discounts the utility of future elections at
5The working paper version of the this paper (Rivas (2014)) extends this assumption by allowing voters to
be strategic players that have the number of times the politician needs to take the public decision in order for
him to be re-elected as their choice variable.
6Alternatively, it could be assumed that the politician receives some one-off benefit from taking the public
decision.
7Even though we assume the private decision to be action 1, the private decision could change period by
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a rate β ∈ (0, 1).
The fact that both the utility from popularity and the utility from following his private
agenda are divided by 2 is done to make calculations easier but it has no effect on the results.
The discount factor β is applied not to future periods but to future elections; this is to have
β as a measure of how much the politician wants to be re-elected. Note that the politician
does not derive utility from holding office per se as his only sources of utility are popularity
and private agenda. However, since he can only receive these when he is in power, both
popularity and private agenda are a motivation for re-election.
Define 12u(st, dt) as the utility the politician receives in period t given st and dt. Following
the description above we have that
u(st, dt) =


1 if dt = st = 0,
1 + α if dt = st = 1,
α if dt 6= st = 0,
0 if dt 6= st = 1.
Let uE(θt, dt) be the expected value of u(st, dt) at time t after θt is known. Thus, we can
write
uE(θt, dt) =


q if dt = θt = 0,
q + α if dt = θt = 1,
1− q + α if dt 6= θt = 0,
1− q if dt 6= θt = 1.
Define dt : {0, . . . , t − 1} × {0, 1} → {0, 1} as the plan of the politician such that his
decision at time t is given by dt(rt−1, θt) for all t. In an abuse of notation we also refer to
dt as the realization of dt(rt−1, θt). Let uE(dt) be the expected value of uE(θt, dt) before
the realization of θt is known when the politician follows plan dt. Finally, define UE as the
maximum expected discounted utility the politician receives from playing the game (i.e. the
continuation value), we have that UE is given by
UE = max
{dt}t=2t=1
{
1
2
2∑
t=1
uE(dt) + Pr (r2 ≥ 1)βUE
}
.
Note that both the one-period expected payoff uE and the continuation value UE include
the possible payoffs from popularity and private agenda α. Thus, even if the politician does
not play the selfish action in the current term in office, he may still enjoy the selfish payoff
in the future if he is re-elected.
period. This would make no difference to our results but would complicate the exposition.
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Given that the plan dt for all t is contingent on all the possible values of θt and rt−1, it
is irrelevant whether the politician chooses the plan dt at time t after knowing θt or at the
beginning of the game before knowing θ1. Thus, for simplicity we assume that the politician
chooses {dt}
t=T
t=1 at the beginning of the game.
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Note that at any t, if θt = 1 then choosing dt = 1 maximizes the continuation value of the
politician: if dt = 1 then the politician’s one-period expected utility is q + α while if dt = 0
then the politician’s one-period expected utility is 1− q, which is smaller than q + α for any
α ≥ 0 as q ∈
[
1
2 , 1
]
. Moreover, the chances that the politician is re-elected are higher by
taking the decision dt = 1 than by taking the decision dt = 0 whenever θt = 1 as q ∈
[
1
2 , 1
]
.
Thus, if the politician receives signal 1 his optimal plan, in the sense that it maximizes his
present and future expected utility, is to take the decision 1. Therefore, from now on we only
consider plans of the politician such that dt(rt−1, 1) = 1 for all t and all rt−1.
If at a given t we have that θt = 0, whether or not the politician chooses dt(rt−1, 0) = 0
or dt(rt−1, 0) = 1 depends on the parameters of the model and the value of rt−1. The target
our analysis is to identify this dependence. We refer to the plan dt(rt−1, 0) = 0 as the honest
plan, as the politician chooses what he believes to be the public decision even though it goes
against his private benefit. If the politician chooses a plan with dt(rt−1, 0) = 0 we say that
he is honest at time t for given rt. Otherwise, if dt(rt−1, 0) = 1, we say that he is not honest.
To simplify exposition, if the politician is indifferent between being honest or not we assume
he is honest.
3 Analysis
There are eight possible plans maximizing UE , we label those as HH, DD, HD, DH, HCw,
DCw, HCr and DCr. In these acronyms, we use the following convention: H stands for being
honest, D stands for not being honest (dishonest), C stands for the behavior that conditions
being honest in the second period on whether or not the public decision was taken in the
first period. In particular, the acronym Cw means that the politician is honest in the second
period if and only if the public decision was not taken in the first period (the politician was
“wrong”). The acronym Cr means to be honest in the second period if and only if the public
decision was taken in the first period (the politician was “right”). In detail:
- HH: d1(0, 0) = 0 and d2(r1, 0) = 0 for all r1.
8This does not mean that the politician commits to a certain sequence of plans {dt}
t=2
t=1. The politician can
choose any plan dt at time t but, given that dt is contingent on all relevant information up to time t, this plan
is no different than the one he would have chosen at the beginning of the game. Likewise, this assumption
poses no time consistency problems.
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- DD: d1(0, 0) = 1 and d2(r1, 0) = 1 for all r1.
- HD: d1(0, 0) = 0 and d2(r1, 0) = 1 for all r1.
- DH: d1(0, 0) = 1 and d2(r1, 0) = 0 for all r1.
- HCw: d1(0, 0) = 0, d2(0, 0) = 0 and d2(1, 0) = 1.
- DCw: d1(0, 0) = 1, d2(0, 0) = 0 and d2(1, 0) = 1.
- HCr: d1(0, 0) = 0, d2(0, 0) = 1 and d2(1, 0) = 0.
- DCr: d1(0, 0) = 1, d2(0, 0) = 1 and d2(1, 0) = 0.
We remind the reader that we only consider plans such that d(rt, 1) = 1 for all rt through-
out our analysis as this plan dominates any other plan whenever the politician receives signal
1.
Out of the eight possible plans above only four of them are not dominated, this is our
next result.
Lemma 1. The plans HD, DH, HCr and DCr are dominated by HH, DD, HCw or DCw.
Intuitively, the plans HD and DH are never optimal as it is best for the politician to be
fully honest, HH, to condition his honesty for the second period on how he fared in the first
period, HCw, DCw, HCr and DCr, or to never by honest, DD. The politician may find it
optimal to condition his honesty for the second period on how he fared in the first period:
if his one-period utility is greater by following his private interests than by taking what he
believes to be the public decision, then if he takes the public decision at time t = 1 he has no
incentives to continue being honest as he is going to be re-elected regardless of the outcome
of his decision at time t = 2.
The plans HCr and DCr are never optimal as if the politician receives more one-period
utility by being honest then he maximizes his utility by being honest at both t = 1, 2.
Similarly, if the politician receives more one-period utility by not being honest then a plan
where he is honest after taking the public decision at t = 1 is always dominated by a plan
where he is not honest under the same circumstances.
Using lemma 1, we can obtain the following result:
Theorem 1. The optimal plan is given by:
- HH if and only if α ≤ 2q − 1,
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- HCw if and only if α > 2q − 1 and either β ≥
3−2q
q(11−8q)−2 or
α ≤
q(8 + β − q(4 + 2β))− 3
3 + 2β − q(2 + 11β − 8βq)
.
- DD if and only if β < 416q−5 and
α >
q(8 + 2β)− β − 4
4 + 5β − 16βq
.
- DCw if and only if neither HH, HCw nor DCw are optimal.
In words, Theorem 1 states the following. If the politician’s one-period utility is higher
by being honest than by taking the private decision, the optimal plan is for him to be honest
at both periods, HH. Otherwise, if either he is patient enough with respect to his decision
making skills or if his private interests are not too high then he starts off by being honest in
hopes of taking the public decision to ensure re-election. The politician then, if he takes the
public decision at time t = 1, takes the private decision at time t = 2. On the contrary, if the
politician does not take the public decision at time t = 1, he continues to be honest at time
t = 2 (plan HCw). In this situation, the politician wants to ensure re-election and, hence, if
necessary he is honest at both periods. If the politician is not patient enough and his private
interests are sufficiently high then the optimal plan involves him taking the private decision
at both periods, DD.
Finally, if the politician is not patient enough and his private interests are moderate, he
starts off by taking the private decision and, if he does not have the electorate’s backing
because the private decision did not coincide with the public one at t = 1, he is honest at
time t = 2, i.e. the plan DCw. This is the type of behavior that empirical literature on the
political agency model has tried to identify (see for instance Smart and Sturm (2007), Ferraz
and Finan (2005) or Pettersson-Lidbom (2006)). Note that in our model if the plan DCw is
optimal it is not because of a memory effect nor because of time inconsistency issues.
A conclusion that can be drawn from Theorem 1 is the following:
Result 1. If the politician is a good enough decision maker and he desires to be re-elected
enough, the politician is honest for as long as he has not guaranteed himself re-election re-
gardless of how large his private interests are.
In particular, if q ≥ 58 and β ≥
3−2q
q(11−8q)−2 then for any α ≥ 0 the politician is honest for
as long as he has not guaranteed himself re-election.
Note that a necessary condition for β ≥ 3−2q
q(11−8q)−2 is q ≥
5
8 , as otherwise
3−2q
q(11−8q)−2 > 1
and, hence, it can never be the case that β ≥ 3−2q
q(11−8q)−2 . This is why Theorem 1 does not
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state explicitly the requirement q ≥ 58 anywhere. We include the condition q ≥
5
8 above
because it makes the interpretation of Result 1 easier. The formal proof of Result 1 builds
on the result of Theorem 1 and is presented in the appendix.
To see the intuition behind Result 1, consider the extreme case where q = 1, assume that
the politician has not chosen the public decision in the first period, and he observes θ2 = 0.
If the politician follows his private agenda he obtains a payoff of α2 and the game ends for
him (he is not re-elected). If instead the politician is honest, he obtains a payoff of 12 + βUE :
he takes the public decision with probability 1 which gives him a payoff of 12 and on top of
that he is re-elected, which also gives him the discounted value of playing the game again.
Note now that the continuation payoff UE includes the possibility of following his private
agenda two times in the next term in office. Thus, if he takes the honest decision and then
follows his private agenda twice during his new term in office he obtains a payoff of at least
1
2 + β(
α
2 +
α
2 ).
9 Therefore, if β > 12 then being honest is strictly better than following his
private agenda even if α is unbounded for fixed q and β.
The reason for this result is that if the politician is a good enough decision maker (high
q) and patient enough (desires re-election enough: high β) then by going for re-election he
can enjoy the payoff α more times in discounted expected terms than if he instead follows his
private agenda today in exchange for lower chances of re-election.
We plot the statement in Theorem 1 in figure 2 for four different values of β. The most
notable finding can be seen when β = 0.75 and β = 0.95. The plan where the politician starts
off by taking the private decision and then, if he does not have the electorate’s backing, he
is honest at time t = 2 (the plan DCw) is optimal if either q is low (but not low enough
as to make the plan DD optimal) or high enough. For moderate values of q the optimal
plan is given by HCw. That is, whether the politician follows plan DCw or HCw depends
non-monotonically on the value of q. The intuition for this fact is the following. A good
decision maker can start off by taking the private decision to then be honest only when
elections approach, as he is somewhat certain that he will take the public decision at time
t = 2, guaranteeing himself re-election. A bad decision maker receives a signal that is not
very trustworthy. Hence, the differences in the probability of being re-elected when he follows
his signal and when he ignores it are not too acute. That is, although the politician may value
re-election significantly he believes that re-election is unlikely regardless of how he decides.
Thus, he can guarantee himself the private gain α by barely decreasing his chances of re-
election if he follows the plan DCw. If the politician chooses the plan HCw instead, there
is a chance that he will be honest at both periods, possibly not enjoying α in neither, and
9The politician would get more if θ = 1 at either of the two new periods, which happens with probability
3
4
. In this case, the politician would get a higher payoff this term and, on top of that, he is re-elected again.
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still having a low chance of being re-elected. Therefore, the politician starts off by taking the
private decision and, if the private decision did not happen to coincide with the public one at
t = 1, he then tries to improve his chances of re-election by being honest. Finally, a politician
who is neither a good decision maker nor a bad one needs to be more cautious and start off
by begin honest in order the improve his chances of re-election. Only if the politician has the
public backing because he took the public decision at time t = 1, he then takes the private
decision.
Figure 2: Theorem 1
The conditions under which the plan DCw is optimal in Theorem 1 together with the
observations in the preceding paragraph leads us to the following result:
Result 2. If the politician takes the private decision, the timing at which he does so, i.e.
whether he does so at the beginning of his term in office or at the end, can depend non-
monotonically on how good a decision maker he is.
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More in general, the politicians’ optimal plan can be non-monotonic in his decision making
skills q.
The formal proof of the result above builds on the result of Theorem 1 and is presented in
the appendix. The result above highlights how the politician’s decision making skills affect the
timing of his choices. The behavior of the politician such that he follows his private interests
first and then tries to guarantee himself re-election later is optimal because it ensures the
politician’s private gain while at the same time it also provides him with some possibilities
of being re-elected.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we study a setting where a politician has to take two decisions during his term
in office. For each decision, the politician faces a trade-off between taking what he believes
to be the public decision, and taking the decision that increases his private gain but is likely
to decrease his chances of re-election. In our results we characterize how factors like how
good a decision maker the politician is, how strong his private interests are, and how much
he wants to be re-elected, affect the politician’s incentives to take the public decision.
In our results we find evidence for the behavior where a politician start his terms in office
by taking the private decision and defer taking the socially motivated decision for the second
period before he is up for re-election. Crucially, the fact that the politician chooses to follow
his private agenda first and then tries to take the public decision in order to be re-elected
has no relation with the memory of voters nor with time inconsistency issues; this behavior
is optimal because it ensures the politician’s private gain while at the same time it provides
him with some confidence of being re-elected.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of lemma 1. Let UE(S) be the value of UE when a certain plan
S ∈ {HH,DD,HD,DH,HCw, DCw, HCr, DCr}
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is employed. If the politician employs plan HH then it is true that
UE(HH) =
1
2



 12︸︷︷︸
Pr(s1=0)
q︸︷︷︸
Pr(θ1=0|s1=0)
+
1
2︸︷︷︸
Pr(s1=1)
(q + α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(θ1=1|s1=1)


︸ ︷︷ ︸
t=1
+

 12︸︷︷︸
Pr(s2=0)
q︸︷︷︸
Pr(θ2=0|s2=0)
+
1
2︸︷︷︸
Pr(s2=1)
(q + α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(θ2=1|s2=1)


︸ ︷︷ ︸
t=2


+
β q(2− q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(r≥1)
UE(HH).
Which implies
UE(HH) =
q + α2
1− q(2− q)β
.
Proceeding in a similar fashion, we have that
UE(DD) =
α+ 12
1− 34β
,
UE(HD) =
1
2
(
q + α2
)
+ 12
(
α+ 12
)
1− 1+q2 β
,
UE(DH) =
1
2
(
q + α2
)
+ 12
(
α+ 12
)
1− 1+q2 β
.
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If the politician employs plan HCw then it is true that
UE(HCw) =
1
2



 12︸︷︷︸
Pr(s1=0)
q︸︷︷︸
Pr(θ1=0|s1=0)
+
1
2︸︷︷︸
Pr(s1=1)
(q + α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(θ1=1|s1=1)


︸ ︷︷ ︸
t=1
+
q︸︷︷︸
Pr(θ1=s1)

 12︸︷︷︸
Pr(s2=0)
(1− q + α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(θ2=0|s2=0)
+
1
2︸︷︷︸
Pr(s1=1)
(q + α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(θ2=1|s2=1

+ (1− q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(θ1 6=s1)

1
2
q︸︷︷︸
θ1=0
+
1
2
(q + α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
θ1=1


︸ ︷︷ ︸
t=2


+
β q(2− q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(r≥1)
UE(HCw).
Hence, we have the following:
UE(HCw) =
(
1− q2
) (
q + α2
)
+ q2
(
α+ 12
)
1− q(2− q)β
.
Thus, proceeding as above
UE(DCw) =
1
4
(
q + α2
)
+ 34
(
α+ 12
)
1− 1+q2 β
,
UE(HCr) =
(12 +
q
2)
(
q + α2
)
+ (12 −
q
2)
(
α+ 12
)
1− 1+q2 β
,
UE(DCr) =
1
4
(
q + α2
)
+ 34
(
α+ 12
)
1− 34β
.
Notice now that q ∈
[
1
2 , 1
]
implies q(2− q) ≥ 1+q2 ≥
3
4 . Therefore, if q +
α
2 ≥ α+
1
2 then
we have UE(HH) ≥ UE(HD) = UE(DH), UE(HH) ≥ UE(HCr) and UE(HH) ≥ UE(DCr).
Similarly, if q + α2 ≤ α +
1
2 then UE(HCw) ≥ UE(HCr) , UE(DCw) ≥ UE(HD) = UE(DH),
and UE(DD) ≥ UE(DCr).
Proof of Theorem 1. Given the result in lemma 1, it is true that
UE = max{UE(HH), UE(DD), UE(HCw), UE(DCw)}.
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Recall that
UE(HH) =
q + α2
1− q(2− q)β
,
UE(DD) =
α+ 12
1− 34β
,
UE(HCw) =
(
1− q2
) (
q + α2
)
+ q2
(
α+ 12
)
1− q(2− q)β
,
UE(DCw) =
1
4
(
q + α2
)
+ 34
(
α+ 12
)
1− 1+q2 β
.
We need to check the conditions on q, β and α under which each of the four different
plans above is optimal. We separate the proof in six parts:
Part 1. Plan HH
Since q(2− q) ≥ 1+q2 ≥
3
4 then q +
α
2 ≥ α+
1
2 implies
UE(HH) ≥ UE(DD), UE(HCw), UE(DCw).
Thus, if q + α2 ≥ α +
1
2 then the plan HH is optimal. Moreover, if q +
α
2 ≤ α +
1
2 then it is
easy to see that the plan HCw gives more payoff than the plan HH. Thus, the plan HH is
optimal if and only if q + α2 ≥ α+
1
2 , which can be rewritten as α ≤ 2q − 1.
Part 2. Plans HCw, DCw and DD
We proceed by showing first the conditions under which UE(HCw) ≥ UE(DCw), then we
show the conditions under which UE(DD) > UE(DCw). Finally we prove that if UE(HCw) ≥
UE(DCw) then UE(HCw) ≥ UE(DD) and that if UE(DD) > UE(DCw) then UE(DD) >
UE(HCw).
Part 3. Conditions for UE(HCw) ≥ UE(DCw)
We have that UE(HCw) ≥ UE(DCw) if and only if(
1− q2
) (
q + α2
)
+ q2
(
α+ 12
)
1− q(2− q)β
≥
1
4
(
q + α2
)
+ 34
(
α+ 12
)
1− 1+q2 β
.
Solving for α, this can be rewritten as
α (3 + 2β − q(2 + 11β − 8βq)) ≤ q(8 + β − q(4 + 2β))− 3. (1)
Note now that the expression on the right hand-side is always positive: the minimum of
q(8 + β − q(4 + 2β))− 3 is achieved at β = 0 and q = 12 and for those values q(8 + β − q(4 +
2β))− 3 = 0.
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Consider now that 3 + 2β − q(2 + 11β − 8βq) ≤ 0, then the condition in (1) is satisfied
for any α. We have that 3+ 2β − q(2+ 11β − 8βq) ≤ 0 if and only if β ≥ 3−2q
q(11−8q)−2 . Hence,
UE(HCw) ≥ UE(DCw) if β ≤
3−2q
q(11−8q)−2 .
Assume now that 3+2β− q(2+11β− 8βq) > 0. In this case from equation (1) we obtain
α ≤
q(8 + β − q(4 + 2β))− 3
3 + 2β − q(2 + 11β − 8βq)
.
Hence, if and only if either the inequality above or β ≥ 3−2q
q(11−8q)−2 is satisfied, we have
that UE(HCw) ≥ UE(DCw).
Part 4. Conditions for UE(DD) > UE(DCw)
We have that UE(DD) > UE(DCw) if and only if
α+ 12
1− 34β
>
1
4
(
q + α2
)
+ 34
(
α+ 12
)
1− 1+q2 β
.
Solving for α, this can be rewritten as
α (4 + 5β − 16βq) > q(8 + 2β)− β − 4. (2)
Note now that the expression on the right hand-side of (2) is always positive: q(8+2β)−
β − 4 = (4 + β)(2q − 1) ≥ 0. Thus, in order for equation (2) to be possible, it must be that
its left hand side is positive: 4 + 5β − 16βq > 0. This happens if and only if β < 416q−5 .
Thus, we have that UE(DD) > UE(DCw) if and only if β <
4
16q−5 and, from equation
(2),
α >
q(8 + 2β)− β − 4
4 + 5β − 16βq
.
Part 5. UE(HCw) ≥ UE(DCw) implies UE(HCw) ≥ UE(DD)
Assume first that UE(HCw) ≥ UE(DCw) and β ≥
3−2q
q(11−8q)−2 . We have that β ≥
3−2q
q(11−8q)−2 implies β ≥
4
16q−5 . This is because
3− 2q
q(11− 8q)− 2
≥
4
16q − 5
if and only if q ≥ 12 , which is true in our case.
Since β ≥ 416q−5 implies that UE(DD) ≤ UE(DCw) (see part 4 of the proof), we have that
UE(HCw) ≥ UE(DCw) and β ≥
3−2q
q(11−8q)−2 implies UE(HCw) ≥ UE(DD).
Assume now that UE(HCw) ≥ UE(DCw) but β <
3−2q
q(11−8q)−2 . In this case, we must have
(see part 3 of the proof)
α ≤
q(8 + β − q(4 + 2β))− 3
3 + 2β − q(2 + 11β − 8βq)
.
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We now show that the inequality above together with β < 416q−5 (necessary condition for
UE(DD) > UE(DCw)) implies
α ≤
q(8 + 2β)− β − 4
4 + 5β − 16βq
,
and, hence, UE(DD) ≤ UE(DCw).
We have that
q(8 + β − q(4 + 2β))− 3
3 + 2β − q(2 + 11β − 8βq)
≤
q(8 + 2β)− β − 4
4 + 5β − 16βq
if and only if
(2q − 1)((2 + β)q − 3)(β(16q − 5)− 4) ≥ 0.
Since 2q−1 ≥ 0, (2+β)q−3 ≤ 0 and β(16q−5)−4 < 0 given that β < 416q−5 , the inequality
above is true. Hence, whenever UE(HCw) ≥ UE(DCw) we have UE(DD) ≤ UE(DCw) as
required. Therefore, plan HCw is optimal if and only if plan HH is not optimal (α < 2q− 1)
and the conditions for UE(HCw) ≥ UE(DCw) are satisfied.
Part 6. UE(DD) > UE(DCw) implies UE(DD) > UE(HCw)
If UE(DD) > UE(DCw) then it must be that β <
4
16q−5 and
α >
q(8 + 2β)− β − 4
4 + 5β − 16βq
.
However, as shown in part 5, this implies that
α >
q(8 + β − q(4 + 2β))− 3
3 + 2β − q(2 + 11β − 8βq)
.
Which in turn implies that UE(HCw) < UE(DCw). Thus, UE(DD) > UE(DCw) implies
UE(HCw) < UE(DCw).
Note that the condition
q(8 + 2β)− β − 4
4 + 5β − 16βq
> 2q − 1
can be rewritten as β(−8q2 + 6q − 1) < 0, which is true for any q ≥ 12 . Hence, whenever
UE(DD) > UE(DCw) it is true that α > 2q − 1 and, thus, plan HH is not optimal.
Summing up, if UE(DD) > UE(DCw) then UE(HCw) < UE(DCw) and plan HH is not
optimal. Therefore, plan DD is optimal if and only if the conditions for UE(DD) > UE(DCw)
are satisfied.
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Proof of Result 1. The politician is honest for as long as he has not guaranteed himself re-
election if he is honest in period 1 (before period 1 is resolved he has not had the chance to
secure re-election yet) and if he is honest in period 2 at least in the situations where he did
not take the public decision in period 1. Thus, we have to show that there are values of q
and β for which for any value of α either the plan HH or the plan HCw are optimal.
Assume first that α ≤ 2q − 1. By Theorem 1 the optimal plan is HH, which means that
the politician is honest in both periods.
Assume now that α > 2q−1. If β ≥ 3−2q
q(11−8q)−2 then by Theorem 1 the optimal plan isHCw
which means that the politician is honest in the first period and honest again in the second
period if he did not take the public decision in the first period. Note that β ≥ 3−2q
q(11−8q)−2 is
only possible if q ≥ 58 as otherwise
3−2q
q(11−8q)−2 > 1. This completes the proof.
Proof of Result 2. Assume that β < 3−2q
q(11−8q)−2 . By Theorem 1 we have that in this case
HCw is the optimal plan if and only if
α ≤
q(8 + β − q(4 + 2β))− 3
3 + 2β − q(2 + 11β − 8βq)
.
We now show that the right hand side of this expression is increasing in q at q = 12 and
decreasing in q at q = 1 for β ≥ 14 . By continuity this means that the value of α for which
HCw is the optimal plan is non-monotonic in q.
The sign of the derivative of
α¯(q, β) =
q(8 + β − q(4 + 2β))− 3
3 + 2β − q(2 + 11β − 8βq)
with respect to q is equal to the sign of
(8 + β − 2q(4 + 2β))(3 + 2β − q(2 + 11β − 8βq)−
(q(8 + β − q(4 + 2β))− 3)(−(2 + 11β − 16βq)).
The expression above evaluated at q = 1 equals 2(1 − β)(1 − 4β) which is negative if
β > 14 . The expression above evaluated at q =
1
2 equals (4 − β)(2 −
3
2β), which is positive.
Thus, since the expression α¯(q, β) is continuous in q then the region above its graph is non-
convex for β > 14 , which proves that the value of α for which HCw is the optimal plan can
be non-monotonic in q.10
Figure 2 shows that the assumptions imposed on the parameters of the model in this
proof are non-empty and, thus, the monotonicity can indeed exist.
10Note that β < 3−2q
q(11−8q)−2
implies 3 + 2β − q(2 + 11β − 8βq) > 0 and, hence, the continuity in α¯.
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